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Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical
Adjudication (Part Two): An Examination
of Hypotheses of Bias in Investment
Treaty Arbitration
GUS VAN HARTEN*
This article reports on a study of potential systemic bias in the resolution of ambiguous
legal issues by investment treaty arbitrators. It outlines tentative but significant findings
that the arbitrators in general tended to favour (1) foreign investors over states overall, (2)
foreign investors from major Western capital-exporting states over other foreign investors,
and, albeit based on more limited data, (3) the United States as a respondent state over
other respondent states. The evidence is derived from an extensive content analysis of the
arbitrators’ resolution of fourteen legal issues that are contested among arbitrators or in
secondary literature. The findings clearly support initial expectations of systemic bias
arising from unique incentives of the arbitrators. Yet the study also has important limitations
and there is a range of possible explanations for the findings, some not raising concerns
of inappropriate bias. Broadly, the findings lend support to perceptions that the design of
investment treaty arbitration does not support fair and independent adjudication of the
boundaries of sovereign authority and of disputes involving public funds.
Cet article rend compte d’une étude portant sur la possibilité qu’un parti pris systémique
fausse la résolution de problèmes juridiques ambigus par les arbitres des traités
d’investissement. Il souligne des conclusions provisoires mais importantes voulant que les
arbitres tendent généralement à favoriser 1) les investisseurs étrangers par rapport aux
États, 2) les investisseurs étrangers venant des principaux États occidentaux exportateurs
de capitaux par rapport aux autres investisseurs étrangers et, quoique fondées sur des
données plus limitées, 3) les États-Unis comme État défendeur par rapport aux autres États
défendeurs. La preuve découle d’une analyse étendue du contenu de la résolution par des
arbitres de quatorze questions juridiques qui font l’objet de contestations entre les arbitres
ou dans la documentation secondaire. Les conclusions appuient clairement les attentes
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initiales d’un parti pris systémique découlant des motivations particulières des abrites.
L’étude présente toutefois d’importantes lacunes et de nombreux facteurs pourraient
expliquer ses conclusions, certains d’entre eux n’évoquant pas un parti pris inapproprié. Les
conclusions appuient grosso modo la perception que la conception de l’arbitrage des traités
d’investissement ne permet pas un jugement équitable et indépendant des frontières des
autorités souveraines et des disputes portant sur des fonds publics.
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INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, also known as investor-state dispute

settlement (ISDS), is a uniquely powerful form of international adjudication
that protects foreign investors from countries. Investment treaty arbitration has
attracted public attention in recent years as governments in North America and
Europe have pressed to expand its role, most significantly in proposed trade
agreements among developed countries. Since the late 1960s and especially in
the 1990s, investment treaty arbitration has been incorporated into bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) between a developed and a developing or transition
country or, alternatively, among developing and transition countries. One
Western developed country, Canada, has agreed to investment treaty arbitration
with the United States (in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)).1
One other agreement, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT),2 has applied investment
treaty arbitration among developed countries and it was limited to the energy
sector. The push to expand investment treaty arbitration in the Europe-US
1.
2.

North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the Government of
Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 2, 32
ILM 296 (entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA].
Energy Charter Treaty, 17 December 1994, 34 ILM 373 (annex I of the Final Act of the
European Energy Charter Conference) [ECT].
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Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Canada-Europe
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and the US-led
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), in particular, signals a turning point in the
position of investment treaty arbitration. It would establish investment treaty
arbitration as a near-global institution for regulating and disciplining countries in
order to protect multinational companies and very wealthy individuals, who are
the foreign investors that have received by far most of the public compensation
ordered in investment treaty arbitration.
Investment treaty arbitration is an exceptional form of adjudication.3 It is
unique in its use of a for-profit asymmetrical model of adjudication to resolve
questions about sovereign authority and public compensation for private actors.
The model is for-profit because arbitrators are appointed and paid by the case
rather than for a set term with a secure tenure and salary. It is asymmetrical
because only one class of claimants brings claims against the other. Investment
treaty arbitration also incorporates the exceptionally powerful remedy of an
unlimited retrospective damages award against the state, for its sovereign activities,
that becomes widely enforceable against the state’s assets in other countries with
limited or no prospect for judicial review. These features are fundamental to the
design of investment treaty arbitration and they are present in all versions of ISDS
now proposed by governments for agreements such as the TTIP, CETA, and TPP.
These features also create a useful context in which to examine hypotheses of bias
arising from the evident incentives of the arbitrators.
For the present study, it was expected that arbitrators would favour some
actors over others due to their interest in re-appointment and in expanding
the role of the arbitration industry and that this incentive structure might help
explain arbitrator behaviour. The expectation was tested through the systematic
coding of fourteen legal issues and how they were resolved by arbitrators in
situations where the arbitrators faced silence or ambiguity in an investment treaty.
The hypotheses were that the arbitrators would tend to favour expansive (i.e.,
favouring the claimant investor) over restrictive (i.e., favouring the respondent
state) resolutions of issues, that this tendency would increase where the claimant
was from a major capital-exporting state, and that the tendency would decrease
where the respondent was a major capital-exporting state.

3.

For a detailed outline, see Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) [Van Harten, Public Law].
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The study is based on a systematic content analysis4 of publicly available
awards dealing with in 140 known cases under investment treaties. The awards
were coded for resolutions by arbitrators of a series of jurisdictional and
substantive legal issues that were contested in existing awards or secondary
literature. The coded data was used to test three hypotheses developed in advance
based on the expectations about arbitrator interests arising from the system’s
unique structure. In this article, the results of the second phase of the project
are examined. The second phase involved systematic coding—as expansive,
restrictive, or non-classifiable—of resolutions by arbitrators of seven substantive
issues. The first phase, reported previously,5 involved coding of seven jurisdictional
issue resolutions. In that phase, it was found that there was a tendency toward
expansive resolutions that enhanced the compensatory promise of the system for
claimants and that this tendency was accentuated where the claimant was from a
Western capital-exporting state. The latter finding focused on claimants from the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (although German
claimants were an apparent exception to the overall tendency for the group)
and was supported by additional analyses of other Western capital-exporting
state groupings.
In the second phase of the project, reported here, it was confirmed that the
arbitrators tended to adopt an expansive approach favouring claimants and that
the tendency was accentuated for the grouping of US, UK, French, and German
claimants. Perhaps most notably, it was also found, based on the cumulative
results of both phases, that there was a reduced tendency toward expansive
resolutions where the respondent was the United States. This tendency was
observed in relation to the US experience as a respondent faced with claims by
Canadian investors under NAFTA. It had not been possible in the first phase of
the project to test reliably the hypothesis that arbitrators would favour restrictive
approaches if the respondent was a major Western capital-exporter due to lack
of data. Finally, it was found that, where an arbitrator was frequently appointed,
there was an accentuated tendency toward expansive resolutions of jurisdictional
issues but such a tendency was not found for substantive issues.
These findings in the second phase of the project support the original
hypotheses of bias, especially in favour of the United States via its nationals
4.
5.

See Mark A Hall & Ronald F Wright, “Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions”
(2008) 96:1 Cal L Rev 63.
See Gus Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical
Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2012) 50:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 211 [Van Harten,
“Arbitrator Behaviour”].
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acting as claimants and its status as a respondent state. The evidence did not
prove such bias because in social scientific research there are always other possible
explanations for findings, i.e., correlation does not mean causation. Even so, it
was surprising to find significant evidence of the role of claimant nationality
and respondent identity in predicting the behaviour of arbitrators when they are
faced with silence or ambiguity in an investment treaty. Because they involve the
resolution of legal questions, the observed variations in resolutions seem unlikely
to be explained by some untested factors that may drive case outcomes, such as
factual differences among cases.6 Whatever the explanation for the results, the
evidence tentatively supports perceptions that investment treaty arbitration is not
fair and independent.

I. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
In examining hypotheses of bias in investment treaty arbitration, the study
focused on two sets of actors on whom the arbitrators appear dependent due
to the institutional context in which they operate: prospective claimants and
major capital-exporting states. The influence of prospective claimants stems from
their power to initiate the use of the system in all cases and from the wider role
of foreign investors (especially major companies) as arbitration users, indirect
participants in decision making at arbitration bodies such as the International
Chamber of Commerce, and negotiators of investment contracts containing
arbitration clauses.7 The influence of major capital-exporting states stems from
their role in negotiating investor-state arbitration in investment treaties and
from their relative power in arbitration bodies such as the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, where such states choose or nominate the officials who in turn
choose the individuals who either (1) arbitrate cases when the parties do not
agree on an arbitrator or (2) choose who will exercise this case-by-case arbitrator
appointment power.8
6.

7.

8.

See e.g. Brian Leiter, “Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence”
(1997) 76:2 Tex L Rev 267 at 269; Jonathan P Kastellec, “The Statistical Analysis of
Judicial Decisions and Legal Rules with Classification Trees” (2010) 7:2 J Empirical Leg
Stud 202 at 205-06.
See Gus Van Harten, “Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the Rule
of Law” in Stephan Schill, ed, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 627 [Van Harten, “Procedural Fairness and the
Rule of Law”].
Ibid.
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The expectations informing this study were derived from wider claims about
perceived or actual bias in investment treaty arbitration. Such claims have been
made by various commentators who have expressed concern that investment
treaty arbitration favours foreign investors, corporations, G-8 countries, Western
countries, or capital-exporting countries, and disfavours governments, the
public, Third World states, developing countries, capital-importing countries,
or low- or middle-income countries. For example, De Ly et al argue that a
pro-investor imbalance arose in the system because investors can bring claims
against host states but not vice versa;9 Chung argues that developing countries are
disadvantaged in investor-state arbitration in contrast to industrialized, developed
nations;10 Stewart raises concerns about pro-Western bias;11 Odumosu refers to
the number of claims against Third World developing countries as opposed to
capital exporting states and the industrialized West;12 and Bolivian President Evo
Morales reportedly claimed bias in ICSID arbitration in favour of transnational
companies and against governments other than the United States.13 The present
study is not apposite to all of these claims. It was designed to test expectations
of suspected bias in favour of foreign investors as claimants and in favour of
major capital-exporting states, including the United States, as respondents or
via a state’s nationals acting as claimants. In other words, it was designed to
test whether arbitrators would favour claimants in general, whether they would
favour claimants especially when they were associated with a major state, and
whether they would soften their approach by disfavouring claimants when the
claim was against a major state (i.e., the United States) despite the arbitrators’
apparent incentive to favour claimants in general.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Filip De Ly et al, “Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment Arbitration? Are Investors and
Host States on a Level Playing Field?” (2005) 6 J World Investment & Trade 59 at 69.
Olivia Chung, “The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect on the
Future of Investor-State Arbitration” (2007) 47:4 Va J Int’l L 953 at 963-66.
Ercus Stewart, “Arbitration in the Developing World” (Paper delivered at the Cortina 2008
CPE Legal Conference, 7 January 2008) at 3, 8, online: <cpeconferences.com/wp-content/
uploads/2013/01/Paper-Stewart-Cortina08.pdf>.
Ibironke T Odumosu, “The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third
World” (2007) 8:2 San Diego Int’l LJ 345 at 346-48, 364, 371-72.
See “Evo Morales plantea buscar fórmula para neutralizar el CIADI,” El Economista (29
April 2007), online: <ecoaula.eleconomista.es/empresas-finanzas/noticias/204986/04/07/
Evo-Morales-plantea-buscar-formula-para-neutralizar-el-CIADI.html> (“En estos pleitos
siempres los ganan las transnacionales nunca ganan los gobiernos. El único gobierno que
ganó una vez fue el de EE.UU.”).
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The study was based on a systematic content analysis14 of all publicly available
decisions by investment treaty arbitrators in the 140 known cases under investment
treaties up until May 2010, when the coding process began. The decisions were
coded for resolutions by arbitrators of fourteen legal issues that were contested
in arbitrators’ decisions or secondary literature. The cumulative results for these
fourteen issues, across a total of 1001 issue resolutions per arbitrator, indicated a
strong tendency toward resolutions that enhanced the compensatory promise of
investment treaty arbitration for foreign investors and its financial risks for states.
This tendency was accentuated where the claimant had the nationality of a major
Western capital-exporter and was particularly evident where the claim was under
a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) or the ECT; where the claim involved any
of eleven of the fourteen issues coded; and, with respect to jurisdictional issues,
where the claim was resolved by frequently appointed arbitrators. The tendency
was reduced where the claim was against the United States, although this finding
was based on a more limited number of issue resolutions and, in all instances,
involved claims against the United States by Canadian investors under NAFTA.
The study has important limitations. It does not establish evidence of actual
bias on the part of any individual or in any particular case.15 There is a range
of possible explanations, some not entailing inappropriate bias, and further
inferences are needed to connect the observed tendencies to the study’s underlying
rationales. There are important limitations in the coding process and analytical
tools and, overall, in the use of quantitative methods to examine potential
adjudicative bias.16 The number of data points (i.e., discrete issue resolutions)
and thus the robustness of the findings varied for the different hypotheses. The
most reliable finding is the new and cumulative one that the observed tendencies
appear to exist in the coded data, that they apply both to jurisdictional and
substantive issues, and that they are unlikely to be explained by chance.

14. Hall & Wright, supra note 4.
15. See e.g. Gregory C Sisk & Michael Heise, “Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic
Debates About Statistical Measures” (2005) 99:2 Nw UL Rev 743 at 794; David E Bloom,
“Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior under Conventional Arbitration” (1986) 68:4 Rev
Econ & Statistics 578.
16. See e.g. Hall & Wright, supra note 4 at 87-88; Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis:
An Introduction to Its Methodology (Newbury Park, Cal: Sage Publications, 1980) at 22;
CGG Aitken & F Taroni, “Fundamentals of Statistical Evidence—A Primary for Legal
Professionals” (2008) 12:3 Int’l J Evidence & Proof 181 at 203.
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II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A more detailed outline of the theoretical basis for the study is provided
elsewhere.17 In summary, the unconventional structure of investment treaty
arbitration provides a unique context for testing expectations of adjudicator
behaviour. The system of investment treaty arbitration is unique because it
uses arbitration to resolve corporate and individual claims against the state in
its sovereign capacity.18 In domestic legal systems, such disputes are resolved
ultimately in courts, not by arbitrators. Conventionally, in international law, the
use of arbitration to resolve such disputes would be based on a framework of
reciprocal state-to-state dispute resolution. The same basic reciprocal framework
applies to the arbitration of commercial disputes. In rare situations where
individuals can sue states directly in international law, such as at the European
courts, international courts resolve the disputes.19
Thus, in contrast to other forms of arbitration,20 investment treaty arbitration
is non-reciprocal because investors can sue sovereign states directly under a treaty
and cannot themselves be sued (other than in the limited and hypothetical
circumstances of a permissible counter-claim by a state). Further, the system does
not employ the usual safeguards of judicial independence otherwise present in
domestic and international courts, such as secure tenure, an objective means of
case assignment, and restrictions on outside remuneration by the judge. Instead,
arbitrators are appointed and paid by the case, assigned to specific cases by the
parties or by executive officials, and allowed to work on the side as lawyers who
advise clients that may have an interest in how the treaties are interpreted by
the arbitrators.21
The broad question in this study was how this unique combination of
structure and function may affect arbitrator behaviour. The system’s asymmetrical
structure and absence of conventional institutional safeguards creates apparent
incentives for arbitrators to favour the class of parties (investors, especially
deep-pocketed ones) that are able to trigger use of the system and appointment
of arbitrators.22 Arbitrators may also be influenced by an interest to appease those
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour,” supra note 5 at 219-21.
Ibid at 217.
See Van Harten, Public Law, supra note 3, ch 3.
See Stewart, supra note 11 at 3.
See Van Harten, “Procedural Fairness and the Rule of Law,” supra note 7.
Ibid. See e.g. Christopher R Drahozal, “Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process” (1998)
51 SMU L Rev 469 at 500, 503; Nudrat Majeed, “Investor-State Disputes and International
Law: From the Far Side” (2004) 98 Am Soc’y Int’l L Proc 30 at 31.
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with power over arbitrator appointments or with influence over the position of
the arbitration industry more broadly.23 It is certainly not suggested that these
expectations are the only possible factors that may influence arbitrator behaviour.
A range of factors and complex interactions is undoubtedly present in the thought
process of adjudicators and in the deliberations of a tribunal. Yet the economic
factors isolated here do reflect issues of rational self-interest and marketability
that have been identified by commentators as playing a role in arbitration and are
connected to the suspicions of bias identified earlier.24
The project sought to test three a priori hypotheses.25 The first was that
investment treaty arbitrators, when exercising their discretion to resolve contested
legal issues, would tend to adopt expansive resolutions (favouring the claimant
investor) over restrictive ones (favouring the respondent state). This expectation
flowed from apparent incentives of arbitrators to encourage claims by signalling
to prospective claimants that claims are reasonably likely to succeed.26 The second
and third hypotheses were, respectively, that the expected tendency toward
expansive approaches would be accentuated in cases brought by claimants from
a major Western capital-exporting state, represented primarily by the grouping
of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and that
the tendency would be lessened in cases against any of those four countries.27
These hypotheses were based on expectations that arbitrators would be more
responsive to the interests of major Western capital-exporting states, due to the
relative influence of these states in institutions that have default power to appoint
arbitrators and due to their role as the primary drivers of the treaty models on
which investment treaties are based including their widespread incorporation of
investor-state arbitration.28

23. Walter Mattli, “Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration” (2001)
55:4 Int’l Org 919 at 921-22.
24. See e.g. supra notes 1-5; Alan Scott Rau, “Integrity in Private Judging” (1997) 38:2 S Tex L
Rev 485 at 521-22.
25. For other potential hypotheses identified in the planning of the project, and for an outline
of my preconceptions on the hypotheses, see Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour,” supra
note 5 at 224-25.
26. Bernard Trujillo, “Regulating Bankruptcy Abuse: An Empirical Study of Consumer
Exemptions Cases” (2006) 3:3 J Empirical Leg Stud 561 at 576.
27. On why these states were identified as the primary measure of major Western
capital-exporters, see Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour,” supra note 5 at 225.
28. Ibid at 216-21.
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III. METHODOLOGY AND ITS LIMITATIONS
Fourteen issues were selected at the outset for coding with the aim of covering
a reasonable range of contested jurisdictional and substantive issues under the
treaties that allow investor-state arbitration. They were identified based on a review
of existing awards (i.e., decisions) and secondary literature, and on consultations
with outside legal experts.29 The coded issues included seven jurisdictional
issues in the first phase of the project and seven substantive issues in the second
phase.30 The combined results for all fourteen issues offered the most robust basis
for testing the hypotheses. The methodology for identifying contested issues,
outlining expansive or restrictive resolutions of each issue, and coding the seven
jurisdictional issues is discussed elsewhere.31 The seven jurisdictional issues and
their corresponding expansive and restrictive resolutions were:
• Corporate person investor: Should a claim be permissible where
ownership of the investment extends through a chain of companies
running from the host to the home state via a third state? Expansive
approach: yes. Restrictive approach: no.
• Natural person investor: Should a claim be permissible where
brought by a natural person (a) against the only state of which the
person is a citizen, or (b) against a state of which the person is a
citizen without confirmation of dominant and effective nationality?
Expansive approach: yes to either of the two questions. Restrictive
approach: no to either of the two questions.
• Concept of investment: Should the Fedax criteria32 be applied
to limit the concept of investment under the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States (ICSID Convention);33 or, regardless of whether under
the ICSID Convention, should there be a requirement for an actual
29. Ibid at 228.
30. A contested issue relating to one substantive standard, most-favoured-nation (MFN)
treatment, was coded under jurisdictional issues because it related primarily to a tribunal’s
authority to hear a claim by using MFN treatment to transfer dispute settlement provisions
from one treaty to another.
31. See Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour,” supra note 5 at 225-27.
32. Fedax NV v Republic of Venezuela (1997), 37 ILM 1378 (International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes) [Fedax].
33. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, 18 March 1965, ICSID/15/Rev 1, 4 ILM 524 (entered into force 14 October 1966)
[ICSID Convention].
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transfer of capital into the host state as a feature of an investment;
or should the concept of investment be limited to traditional
categories of ownership? Expansive approach: no to any of the three
questions. Restrictive approach: yes to any of the three questions.
• Minority shareholder interests: Should a claim by a minority
shareholder be allowed where the treaty does not permit claims by
minority shareholders, such as where the treaty does not include
the term “shares” in the definition of investment; or should it be
permitted without limiting the claim to the shareholder’s interest in
the value and disposition of the shares (as opposed to interests of the
domestic firm itself )? Expansive approach: yes to either of the two
questions. Restrictive approach: no to either of the two questions.
• Permissibility of investment: Should there be an evident onus
placed on the claimant (or the respondent state) to show that an
investment was (or was not) affirmatively approved or was (or was
not) based on corrupt practices? Expansive approach: onus on the
respondent state. Restrictive approach: onus on the claimant.
• Parallel claims: Should a claim be allowed in the face of a treaty-based
duty to resort to local remedies that clearly was not satisfied by the
claimant; a contractually-agreed dispute settlement clause relating
to the same factual dispute; an actual claim, arising from the same
factual dispute, via the relevant path of a treaty-based fork-in-road
clause;34 or an actual claim, arising from the same factual dispute,
via another treaty that could lead to a damages award in favour of
the investor? Expansive approach: yes to any of the four questions.
Restrictive approach: no to any of the four questions.
• Scope of most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment: Should the
concept of MFN treatment be extended to non-substantive
provisions of other treaties (such as dispute settlement provisions)?
Expansive approach: yes. Restrictive approach: no.
The focus in this article is on the cumulative findings and coding of the
substantive issues, all of which arose from silence or ambiguity in the treaties’
relevant provisions. The issues were coded using pre-set guidelines reproduced
in detail in Appendix I with footnotes to indicate the sources that were used to

34. A fork-in-the-road clause requires an investor to choose between pursuing one or more paths
that may be available to adjudicate the dispute with the host state, such as domestic courts
and investment treaty arbitration.
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model expansive and restrictive approaches. In summary, the seven substantive
issues and their corresponding expansive and restrictive resolutions were:35
• National treatment: Can this standard be breached where
the compared foreign and domestic investors are not in like
circumstances, where the like circumstances are established based
only on the existence of a competitive relationship between the
compared investors, or where there is only limited evidence of de
facto discrimination or protectionist intent? Expansive approach:
yes to any of the sub-questions. Restrictive approach: no to any of
the sub-questions.
• Fair and equitable treatment (FET) (autonomous standard): Is this
standard autonomous of customary international law? Expansive
approach: yes. Restrictive approach: no.
• FET (content): Does this standard encompass a novel conception of
the state’s obligations—indicated by terms such as “idiosyncratic,”
“unreasonable,” “legitimate expectations,” “stability of the legal
or business framework,” “affirmative transparency obligations,”
or breach of another international obligation—beyond the
conventional Neer and ELSI terminology of “outrage,” “bad faith,”
“wilful disregard of due process of law,” “wilful neglect of duty,” et
cetera?36 Expansive approach: yes. Restrictive approach: no.
• Full protection and security: Does this standard go beyond issues of
physical security to include issues of legal security or stability of the
investment climate, or does the standard assign full responsibility to
the state where a foreign investor suffers physical harm without any
discussion of a surrounding context of severe longstanding conflict
in a country? Expansive approach: yes to either sub-question.
Restrictive approach: no to either sub-question.
• Indirect expropriation: Is the standard breached based solely or
primarily on the effect of a measure rather than other potentially
relevant factors, based on the measure’s effects being a significant or
substantial taking as opposed to a near-complete taking, or based
on conceptual severance of the affected property right or economic
35. The substantive issues were numbered 8 to 14 to distinguish them from the jurisdictional
issues reported at the beginning of Part III, above.
36. LFH Neer and Pauline Neer (USA) v United Mexican States, (1926) 4 RIAA 60 at 61-62
[Neer]; Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (United States of America v Italy), Judgment, [1989]
ICJ Rep 15 [ELSI].
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interest? Expansive approach: yes to any of the sub-questions.
Restrictive approach: no to any of the sub-questions.
• Umbrella clause: Can this standard be violated by private or
commercial acts in addition to public or sovereign acts of the state?
Expansive approach: yes. Restrictive approach: no.
• National security exception: Does this exception exclude emergency
measures to address a domestic financial and economic crisis?
Expansive approach: yes. Restrictive approach: no.
Where an issue was found to have arisen in a tribunal’s award, each arbitrator’s
resolution of the issue was classified as expansive, restrictive, or non-classifiable.
The expansive and restrictive approaches for each issue reflected positions that
enhanced or reduced, respectively, the compensatory promise of the system for
claimants and the risk of liability for states. Non-classifiable situations included
resolutions that, as explained in the award, did not fall reasonably within the scope
of an expansive or restrictive approach in the coding guidelines. Non-classifiable
situations also included instances in which the claim or argument was withdrawn
by a party, the tribunal found it unnecessary to resolve the issue, or the issue
appeared to have been resolved specifically and expressly by the treaty. In the
latter situation, the resolution of the issue was not coded as expansive or restrictive
because it was not considered a sufficient exercise of arbitrator discretion.
The primary data source was the text of arbitrators’ awards (and other
decisions) in all known investment treaty cases decided by 10 May 2010 and
publicly available by 1 June 2010.37 In summary, descriptive information on
known cases was initially double-coded, but not blindly, by law student research
assistants over a three-year period. A more involved coding process was then
used to determine whether an issue had arisen and, if so, whether its resolution
appeared expansive or restrictive. Cases were double-coded, although not blindly,
by a law student research assistant and by the author. One student coded all
jurisdictional issues in the first phase of the project; a different student coded all
of the substantive issues in the second phase. In both phases, disagreements over
37. The coding process is outlined in more detail in Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour,” supra
note 5 at 225-27. A case was “known” (1) where it was listed on the Investment Treaty
Arbitration website with an indication that it was brought under an investment treaty; or
(2) where it was listed as a treaty-based case on any of the websites of ICSID, the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, the Energy Charter Treaty Secretariat, or the governments of Canada,
Mexico, or the United States. A case was “publicly-available” where a decision on any
jurisdictional or substantive issues was posted on the Investment Treaty Arbitration website.
For the Investment Treaty Arbitration website, see italaw, “Newly Posted Awards, Decisions
& Materials” (2015), online: <www.italaw.com>.
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coding were resolved on an anonymous basis by a third coder who was a research
assistant and lawyer familiar with international investment law. All coders were
urged to form autonomous opinions when making coding decisions.
The methodology for identifying issue resolutions, as summarized here, is
subject to important limitations. It focused on a sample of jurisdictional and
substantive issues, meaning that other aspects of arbitrator discretion were
excluded from the study. The coding could not capture any issues or resolutions
not outlined in the text of an award.38 The study covered all available cases to
the date when coding began, yet some materials in known cases were not public
and, in an unknown number of totally secret cases such as at the International
Chamber of Commerce’s Court of International Arbitration, it is not possible to
verify publicly that an investor-state claim was brought and decided by arbitrators
at all. The study tested expectations at a systemic level—observable in the overall
decision making of arbitrators—but was not designed to test for actual bias on
the part of any particular arbitrator.39
For substantive issues, inter-coder reliability among the first and second
coders was 78.5% on whether an issue had arisen for coding as expansive
or restrictive and 98.9% on whether the issue resolution should be coded as
expansive or restrictive (each compared to a random chance of reliability of 50%).
Even so, coder discretion was integral despite the steps taken to limit it, and
double-coding was not blind.40 For purposes of transparency and replication, the
coding guidelines for the project are appended and issue-by-issue coding notes,
which provided the basis for coding inferences, are publicly available.41
Overall, the study establishes approximate correlations, not firm conclusions.42
The study identified significant evidence to support the hypotheses, but it is only
a single study based on a particular method. Perhaps most importantly, although
incidental to the immediate project, the inherent uncertainty of any study on

38. Hall and Wright, supra note 4 at 100.
39. Lisa B Bingham, “On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics
in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards” (1998) 29:2 McGeorge L
Rev 223 at 259.
40. See e.g. Hall and Wright, supra note 4 at 109; Michael Evans et al, “Recounting the Courts?
Applying Automated Content Analysis to Enhance Empirical Legal Research” (2007) 4:4 J
Empirical Leg Stud 1007 at 1008-09.
41. The coding notes will be posted on the Social Science Research Network under my name
following publication of this article. See Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc, “Gus Van
Harten” (2016), online: Social Science Research Network <www.ssrn.com/author=638855>.
42. Matthew Hall, “Randomness Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial Assignment in the
US Courts of Appeals” (2010) 7:3 J Empirical Leg Stud 574 at 574-75.
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possible adjudicative bias reinforces the case for safeguards of independence at
the institutional level to protect against reasonably perceived as well as actual bias.

IV. DATASET
In total, 261 cases were identified as having been decided as of 10 May 2010
and publicly available in English as of 1 June 2010, when coding for the project
began. Of these, 174 cases had led to at least one award that dealt with any
jurisdictional or substantive issues. In 21 of the 174 cases, an award was not
publicly available. In another eight cases, an award was not available in English.
Another three cases had been consolidated with another case and were coded
under the consolidated case. This left 142 cases that could be coded as publicly
available, English-language awards on jurisdictional or substantive matters
in known cases that had led at least to an award on jurisdiction by the cut-off
dates for the study. The cases arose primarily under bilateral investment treaties
(78%) and secondarily under NAFTA (14%), the ECT (6%), and the ASEAN
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (ASEAN Investment
Agreement) (1%).43 In twelve of the 142 cases, no jurisdictional or substantive
issue was found to have arisen, leaving 130 cases in which one or more issues had
arisen. Of these, there were 123 cases in which at least one issue was resolved
expansively or restrictively by one or more arbitrators.
The same dataset was used for the coding of substantive and jurisdictional
issues, although a different range of cases in the dataset proved relevant to each
type of issue. For the substantive issues, 80 cases were available for content
analysis, while for the jurisdictional issues, 140 cases were available. This was
because in 25 cases, jurisdiction was denied to the claimant thus precluding an
award on any substantive issue and, in another 40 cases, no award on substantive
issues was available by the cut-off date for the study. Of the 80 cases that could
be coded for substantive issues, there were 65 in which one or more substantive
issues arose and, in all of those cases, at least one issue was found to have been
resolved restrictively or expansively.

43. An Agreement Among the Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments), 15 December 1987, 27 ILM 612 [ASEAN Investment Agreement].
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V. ANALYTICAL MODEL
The analytical model for the study was developed using eight primary measures of
interest, a dependent variable, and seven covariates used to test the hypotheses.44
In the statistical model, the primary measures of interest were as follows.
Nationality of claimant. Claimants in the dataset had the nationality of 26
different states.
Identity of respondent state. There were 47 states among the respondents
in the dataset.
For these first two measures, the second and third hypotheses were tested
primarily by isolating France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United
States as a group, in comparison to all other states. These supplementary
groupings of states were also analyzed to provide alternative measures of Western
capital-exporting interests:
• The United Kingdom and the United States versus all others;
• France, Germany, and the United Kingdom versus all others (except
the United States);
• Historical G-7 members45 versus all others;
• Western European former colonial powers46 versus all others (except
the United States);
• UN geographic classifications of states in North America, Western
Europe, Northern Europe, and Southern Europe47 versus all others;
• UN classification of states in Eastern Europe48 versus all others
(except North America, Western Europe, Northern Europe, and
Southern Europe);

44. Heather Krause, a statistician and research assistant, conducted the regression analysis and
was asked to test the data rigorously and avoid assumptions that could skew the analysis
in favour of the study’s hypotheses. Kelly Goldthorpe, a law student research assistant and
former statistical analyst, advised on project design and conducted initial data analysis.
45. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
46. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom.
47. Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Bosnia, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Greenland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
48. Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia,
Slovakia, and Ukraine.
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•
•
•

OECD members as of 199049 versus all others;
OECD members as of 200050 versus all others;
World Bank classification of high-income countries as of 199051
versus all others; and
• World Bank classification of high-income countries as of 200052
versus all others.
Importantly, for the third hypothesis involving claims against capital-exporting
states, the only one of the four major Western capital-exporting states against
whom claims had been brought was the United States, which was then compared
to a range of groupings of other states. For this reason, the findings on this third
hypothesis are statistically relevant only to the United States. They may be relevant
to other capital-exporting states from a practical or theoretical perspective, but
not for statistical purposes. The findings of this study provide no basis to predict
what may happen in claims against those other capital-exporting states.
Treaty or treaty type. There were four treaties or treaty types represented in
the data: BITs, NAFTA, the ECT, and the ASEAN Investment Agreement. The
model excluded the last of these because it arose in only one case. Issue resolutions
reached under the other three treaties were analyzed cumulatively, with controls
for variations in treaty or treaty type, except in the case of the third hypothesis.
For that hypothesis, all of the issue resolutions against the United States arose in
claims under NAFTA and thus are specific to NAFTA.
Issue type. There were fourteen coded issues in the study. The issues with
the most resolutions were two jurisdictional issues ((3) Concept of investment,
and (6) Parallel claims) and two substantive issues ((10) Content of fair and
equitable treatment, and (12) Content of indirect or regulatory expropriation).
For these issues, expansive or restrictive resolutions arose in 40 to 50 cases per
issue. The issues with the fewest resolutions, in 2 to 10 cases each, included
three jurisdictional issues (natural person investor, permissibility of investment,
49. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
50. Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, South Korea, and all OECD members
as of 1990 (see ibid).
51. Andorra, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bermuda, Brunei, Canada, Cyprus,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greenland, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Singapore,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.
52. Barbados, Cayman Islands, Greece, Guam, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, Portugal,
Slovenia, and all high income countries as of 1990 (see ibid).
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and scope of umbrella clause) and one substantive issue (essential/national
security exception).
Count of issues per case. The total number of issues that arose and were
resolved expansively or restrictively ranged from one to nine issues per case. The
mean and median were four resolutions per case.
Total appointments per arbitrator. Individual arbitrators in the dataset were
appointed between one and fourteen times. The mean number of appointments
was five and the median was three.
Cases. There were 123 cases in which at least one issue was found to have
been resolved expansively or restrictively.
Arbitrators. There were 204 individuals appointed as arbitrators
in the 123 cases.
The dependent variable was the issue resolution. A total of 376 issues were
coded as having been resolved expansively or restrictively across the 123 cases.
This generated 1001 distinct instances in which an arbitrator resolved an issue.
Of these, 736 resolutions were expansive and 265 were restrictive.
A generalized linear mixed effects model was used to examine the study’s
hypotheses.53 The model combined a linear mixed effects model and a general
linear model. It is similar to a classical general linear model—the best known
of which is logistic regression—with the addition of random effects to the fixed
effects already dealt with in classical regression. A generalized linear mixed effects
model is more flexible and allows for the adaptation of the model to the available
data and its structure. For example, in the present study, the data was nested
within both cases and arbitrators. Nested issues will not be independent of each
other, requiring a model that controls for the resulting correlation. Random
effects were used to account for this. As a general principle, a model should be as
simple as possible while representing the data fairly and adequately.

VI. FINDINGS
A. ANTICIPATED TENDENCY IN FAVOUR OF CLAIMANTS

The first hypothesis predicted that arbitrators would tend to adopt an expansive
approach across all of the coded issues combined. The results supported this
expectation on a significant basis. Thus, there was a very low likelihood that
the variation between expansive and restrictive resolutions among all of the
53. The model was used on the advice of statistician Heather Krause, whose description of the
model is paraphrased in the remainder of this paragraph.
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coded issues was explained by chance. This finding made it safe to reject the
null hypothesis that 50% of the resolutions would be expansive and 50% would
be restrictive.54 Table 1 summarizes the variations in resolutions for all of the
fourteen issues.
55

TABLE 1: CLASSIFICATION OF ISSUE RESOLUTIONS BY ISSUE
Issue
(1) Corporate person investor

Resolution of Issue

Number of Issue
Resolutions

Expansive

Restrictive

72

85%

15%

(2) Natural person investor

6

0%

100%

(3) Concept of investment

119

70%

30%

(4) Minority shareholder interest

75

92%

8%

(5) Permissibility of investment

27

67%

33%

(6) Parallel claims

162

84%

16%

(7) Scope of MFN treatment

60

50%

50%

(8) National treatment

60

35%

65%

(9) Fair and equitable treatment
(autonomous standard)

56

73%

27%

(10) Fair and equitable treatment
(content)

137

83%

17%

(11) Full protection and security

51

57%

43%

(12) Indirect expropriation

120

72.5%

27.5%

(13) Umbrella clause

32

91%

9%

(14) National security exception

24

75%

25%

1001

73.5%

26.5%

Cumulative

Across all issues, expansive resolutions were about three times more common
than restrictive resolutions. This varied modestly between jurisdictional issues
54. The size of the effect was 0.3, which is a strong effect for a one-sample binomial test.
55. All figures are rounded to the nearest whole. There is a slight variation in the results, as
previously reported in Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour,” supra note 5, due to these data
entry corrections to the originally reported data: Issue 6 in Lauder v Czech Republic was
changed from expansive to non-classifiable for all three arbitrators; issue 3 in Joy Mining v
Egypt was changed from expansive to restrictive for all three arbitrators; issue 1 in Sedelmayer
v Russia was changed from restrictive to expansive for arbitrators Magnusson and Wachler
(but not Zykin, whose resolution remained non-classifiable); and issue 6 in Maffezini v Spain
was changed from restrictive to non-classifiable for all three arbitrators.
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(76% expansive) and substantive issues (71% expansive). The tendency in
favour of an expansive approach was reflected in eleven of fourteen issues, as
Table 1 indicates. On the scope of MFN treatment, arbitrators were split and, on
national treatment and natural person investor (albeit with very little data for this
last issue), they tended toward a restrictive approach. The data was examined for
whether the overall tendency varied over time. This revealed a greater tendency
toward expansive resolutions over time, but without any statistically significant
effect for the combined results or for the isolated results for either jurisdictional
or substantive issues.
Thus, it is safe to say that the arbitrators favoured an expansive approach
overall. This supported the hypothesis that the arbitrators would resolve
contested issues in ways that favoured prospective claimants. Tentatively, these
results may be connected to the system’s asymmetrical structure in the absence
of institutional safeguards of independence. Depending on one’s view of how
the expansive and restrictive approaches were classified, the results may cause
concern for those expecting the system to deliver evenness in the resolution of
the coded issues. Respondent states clearly have lost across a range of issues that
arise often in investment treaty arbitration. That said, the results do not explain
fully or establish the truth of any expectation of bias. Also, the overall tendency
did not apply to all issues. Finally, even for the issues that tended most often
to be resolved expansively, some arbitrators took restrictive approaches. This
outcome demonstrates that other factors play a role in the exercise of interpretive
discretion by arbitrators.
B. ANTICIPATED TENDENCY IN FAVOUR OF CLAIMANTS FROM MAJOR
WESTERN CAPITAL-EXPORTING STATES

The second hypothesis was that the tendency in favour of an expansive approach
would be accentuated where the claimant was a national of France, Germany, the
United Kingdom, or the United States as the main Western capital-exporters.
Additional groupings associated with Western capital-exporting interests were
also analyzed. After accounting for the control variables in the model, a significant
relationship was found between the dependent variable (issue resolutions) and
all other variables operating simultaneously, i.e., the tendency toward expansive
resolutions by arbitrators was very unlikely to be explained by chance.56 The
data were also tested for effect sizes, indicating that the model explained 20% of

56. The model generated an F (F=11.72, 23, 150) that was significantly lower than the critical F
value, with a p<.001. Table 7 outlines the results of the model and has been appended.
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the variation in issue resolutions as expansive or restrictive.57 This test estimates
possible inaccuracies in the statistical model; it tends to underestimate rather
than overestimate the strength of the association between issue resolutions and
the predictor variables.58 In 1001 issue resolutions over 123 cases, there was
evidence of a strong tendency in favour of an accentuated expansive approach if
the claimant was a national of a major Western capital-exporting state. Based on
the effect of the control variables, this was most apparent where the claim was
brought under a BIT or the ECT, where it raised any of nine of the coded issues,
and—to a lesser extent and in the case of the jurisdictional issues only—where
the issue was resolved by frequently appointed arbitrators.
The overall effect of the variable of primary interest—claimant nationality—
for the main grouping (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United
States) was significant (F=5.78, 5, 93; p<.001). This supported the expectation
that the claimants from these countries would benefit from an expansive resolution
more often than other claimants. There was a significant likelihood in the case of
both jurisdictional issues (F=5.78, 5, 93; p<.001) and substantive issues (F=4.14,
5, 93; p<=.01) that such claimants were more likely to benefit from an expansive
resolution. Table 2 gives the log odds of each of the five categories of claimant
nationality being resolved expansively with all other covariates held steady,
highlighting that the findings for claimants from individual countries typically
were not statistically significant because they carried a risk of error in excess of
5%. Figure 1 presents the expected probability of an expansive resolution for each
claimant nationality in the first grouping with all other covariates held steady.

57. This was tested using the McFadden R-squared statistic and generated an effect size of .20
overall, indicating that the model explained 20% of the variation in issue resolutions as
expansive or restrictive. See A Colin Cameron & Frank AG Windmeijer, “An R-squared
Measure of Goodness of Fit for Some Common Nonlinear Regression Models” (1997) 77:2 J
Econometrics 329.
58. Table 8 outlines the change in the McFadden pseudo R-squared attributed to each individual
predictor in the model and has been appended.
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TABLE
TABLE 2:
2: EFFECT
EFFECT OF
OF CLAIMAINT
CLAIMAINT NATIONALITY
NATIONALITY (GROUPING
(GROUPING #1)
#1)
ON
ON THE
THE LIKELIHOOD
LIKELIHOOD OF
OF AN
AN EXPANSIVE
EXPANSIVE RESOLUTION
RESOLUTION
Probability
Probability of
of
Claimant
Claimant Nationality
Nationality Expansive Resolution Statistical
Statistical Significance
Significance
Expansive Resolution
France
.66
p=.34
France
.66
p=.34
Germany
Germany
United
United Kingdom
Kingdom

.54
.54
.71
.71

p=.85
p=.85
p=.05
p=.05

United
United States
States
All
All others
others

.66
.66
.56
.56

p=.04
p=.04
P=.31
P=.31

FIGURE
FIGURE 1:
1: PROBABILITY
PROBABILITY OF
OF AN
AN EXPANSIVE
EXPANSIVE RESOLUTION
RESOLUTION BY
BY CLAIMANT
CLAIMANT
NATIONALITY:
NATIONALITY: OVERALL
OVERALL (ISSUES
(ISSUES (1)
(1) TO
TO (14))
(14))

Probability of Expansive Resolution

1

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0

Other

France

Germany

UK

USA

For
For jurisdictional
jurisdictional and substantive issues, US claimants benefited from an
accentuated
accentuated tendency
tendency toward expansive resolutions, although they led the field
only
for
jurisdictional
only for jurisdictional issues. Thus, only the results for jurisdictional issues
supported
supported the
the more
more detailed expectation that US claimants would enjoy the
strongest
strongest accentuation
accentuation of an expansive tendency. That said, country-by-country
results
results had
had aa higher
higher risk of statistical error and were not always significant. For
claimants
claimants from
from the
the United Kingdom and the United States, the country-specific
results
had
a
5%
results had a 5% and 4% risk of error; for claimants from Germany, France, and
other
other states,
states, the
the risk
risk was 85%, 34%, and 31%, and thus not reliable. There was
especially
especially limited
limited country-specific data for claimants of Germany and France; of
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123 cases that generated the issue resolutions, 37 involved a US claimant, eleven
a UK claimant, six a French claimant, and six a German claimant.
The findings were tested further by analyzing other groupings of claimant
nationalities associated with Western capital-exporting interests. The other
groupings included the United States and the United Kingdom as a group;
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States cumulatively (i.e.,
combining all issue resolutions for claimants from these countries); G-7 states;
Western European former colonial powers; OECD member states; and World
Bank high-income states. For each of these groupings, the findings supported
the hypothesis and were statistically significant. Similar tendencies were observed
for other groupings (US claimants alone; French, German, and UK claimants as
a group; and UN geographic groupings) but the findings were not significant.
Table 3 provides a detailed report.
TABLE 3: ANALYSES OF ADDITIONAL GROUPINGS OF CLAIMAINT NATIONALITIES:
OVERALL (ISSUES (1) TO (14))
Grouping
Grouping #2
Group 2A: The United States (n=359)
Group 2B: All other states (n=642)

Grouping #3
Group 3A: France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom (n=181)
Group 3B: All other states (except the United
States) (n=461)

Grouping #4
Group 4A: The United Kingdom, the United
States (n=456)
Group 4B: All other states (n=545)

Summary of Results
The grouping did not have an overall statistically significant effect (F=2.75, 1, 153, p=.10).
Claimants from the United States were 63%
more likely to benefit from an expansive
resolution than claimants from all other states
combined, but the effect was not statistically
significant because it carried a 10% risk that it
was explained by chance.
The grouping did not have an overall statistically significant effect (F=3.47, 1, 153, p=.07).
Claimants from a state in group 3A were
52% more likely to benefit from an expansive
resolution than claimants from all other states
combined except the United States, but the
effect was not statistically significant because
it carried a 7% risk that it was explained by
chance.
The grouping had an overall statistically
significant effect (F=6.14, 1, 153, p=.01).
Claimants from the United Kingdom or the
United States were 68% more likely to benefit
from an expansive resolution than claimants
from all other states combined.
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TABLE 3: ANALYSES OF ADDITIONAL GROUPINGS OF CLAIMAINT NATIONALITIES:
OVERALL (ISSUES (1) TO (14))
Grouping
Grouping #5
Group 5A: France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the United States cumulatively
(n=558)
Group 5B: All other states (n=443)
Grouping #6
Group 6A: Historical G-7 states (n=621)
Group 6B: All other states (n=380)

Grouping #7
Group 7A: Western European former colonial
powers (n=187)
Group 7B: All other states (except the United
States) (n=326)
Grouping #8
Group 8A: States in North America, Western
Europe, Southern Europe, and Northern
Europe (n=849)
Group 8B: All other states (n=152)

Grouping #9
Group 9A: States in Eastern Europe (n=5)
Group 9B: All others (except states in North
America, Western Europe, Southern Europe,
and Northern Europe)

Summary of Results
The grouping had an overall statistically
significant effect (F=5.34, 1, 153, p=.02).
Claimants from a state in group 5A were
67% more likely to benefit from an expansive
resolution than claimants from all other states
combined.
The grouping had an overall statistically
significant effect (F=4.44, 1, 153, p=.03).
Claimants from a state in group 6A were
46% more likely to benefit from an expansive
resolution than claimants from all other states
combined. Notably, there were no cases in
group 6A involving a claimant from Japan.
The grouping had an overall statistically
significant effect (F=7.22, 1, 153, p=.01).
Claimants from a state in group 7A were
48% more likely to benefit from an expansive
resolution than claimants from all other states
combined except the United States.
The grouping did not have an overall statistically significant effect (F=2.81, 1, 153, p=.10).
Claimants from states in group 8A were 31%
more likely to benefit from an expansive
resolution than claimants from all other states
combined, but the effect was not statistically
significant because it carried a 10% risk that
it was explained by chance. As a descriptive
finding, 85% of issue resolutions were in cases
brought by a claimant from a state in group
8A.
The grouping could not be tested because
there were only five cases, in group 9A,
brought by Eastern European claimants.
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TABLE 3: ANALYSES OF ADDITIONAL GROUPINGS OF CLAIMAINT NATIONALITIES:
OVERALL (ISSUES (1) TO (14))
Grouping
Grouping #10
Group 10A: OECD members as of 1990
(n=490)
Group 10B: All other states (n=511)
Grouping #11
Group 11A: OECD members as of 2000
(n=755)
Group 11B: All other states (n=246)
Group #12
Group 12A: High-income states as of 1990
(n=813)
Group 12B: All other states (n=188)

Group #13
Group 13A: High-income states as of 2000
(n=828)
Group 13B: All other states (n=173)

Summary of Results
The grouping had an overall statistically
significant effect (F=6.41, 1, 153, p=.01).
Claimants from states in group 10A were
31% more likely to benefit from an expansive
resolution than claimants from all other states
combined.
The grouping had an overall statistically
significant effect (F=12.42, 1, 153, p=.005).
Claimants from states in group 11A were
27% more likely to benefit from an expansive
resolution than claimants from all other states
combined.
The grouping had an overall statistically
significant effect (F=7.04, 1, 153, p=.008).
Claimants from states in group 12A were
23% more likely to benefit from an expansive
resolution than claimants from all other states
combined. As a descriptive finding, 81% of
issues resolutions were in cases brought by a
claimant from a state in group 12A.
The grouping had an overall statistically
significant effect (F=6.18, 1, 153, p=.01).
Claimants from states in group 13A were
22% more likely to benefit from an expansive
resolution than claimants from all other states
combined. As a descriptive finding, 83% of
issues resolutions were in cases brought by a
claimant from a state in group 13A.

The model controlled for other effects and there was sufficient data to provide
some findings that involve the effect of other factors on the tendency toward
an expansive approach and that are incidental to the original hypotheses of the
study. Perhaps most importantly, it was found that the variable of the specific
issue—among the fourteen coded issues—accounted significantly for about 8%
of the overall variation in issue resolutions (F=39.87, 13, 208, p<.001). This
finding highlighted the importance of focusing on those issues for which there
were extensive data in any comparison of issue-by-issue results. Figure 2 outlines
the issue-by-issue coding results across the 1001 issue resolutions.

26
565

(2016) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

FIGURE 2:
2: BREAKDOWN
BREAKDOWN OF
OF ISSUE
ISSUE RESOLUTIONS
RESOLUTIONS BY
BY SPECIFIC
SPECIFIC ISSUE
ISSUE
FIGURE
160

140

120

Count

100

80

60

40

20

0

1

Resolution

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

Issue

0 = Restrictive
1 = Expansive

Importantly, these
these issue-by-issue
issue-by-issue results
results are
are only
only descriptive;
descriptive; the
the predictive
predictive
Importantly,
analysis
in
the
model
focused
on
the
overall
tendency
in
the
resolution
of all
all
analysis in the model focused on the overall tendency in the resolution of
fourteen
issues
combined.
fourteen issues combined.
The statistical
statistical analysis
analysis also
also revealed,
revealed, incidentally,
incidentally, that
that variations
variations in
in issue
issue
The
resolutions
among
the
three
main
treaties
or
treaty
types
(BITs,
the
ECT,
and
resolutions among the three main treaties or treaty types (BITs, the ECT, and
NAFTA)
had
a
significant
effect
on
variations
in
the
issue
resolutions
overall
NAFTA) had a significant effect on variations in the issue resolutions overall
(F=10.17, 4,
4, 103,
103, p<.001),
p<.001), with
with an
an effect
effect size
size of
of 6%
6% (7%
(7% for
for jurisdictional
jurisdictional
(F=10.17,
issues,
though
only
2%
for
substantive
issues).
Issues
arising
and
resolved
under
issues, though only 2% for substantive issues). Issues arising and resolved under
NAFTA
had
the
lowest
likelihood
of
being
resolved
expansively
and
there
were
NAFTA had the lowest likelihood of being resolved expansively and there were
no
noteworthy
differences
between
BITs
and
the
ECT.
Table
4
indicates
the
no noteworthy differences between BITs and the ECT. Table 4 indicates the
probabilities
for
each
treaty
or
treaty
type
across
the
fourteen
issues,
controlling
probabilities for each treaty or treaty type across the fourteen issues, controlling
for all
all other
other variables.
variables. Again,
Again, these
these are
are descriptive
descriptive findings;
findings; they
they explain
explain what
what
for
happened based
based on
on the
the coded
coded data
data and
and should
should not
not be
be taken
taken to
to predict
predict reliably
reliably
happened
what will
will happen
happen in
in the
the future.
future.
what

Van Harten, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication (Part Two) 566

TABLE 4: EFFECTS OF TREATY OR TREATY TYPE ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN
EXPANSIVE RESOLUTION
Probability

p-value

Bilateral investment treaty (BIT)

.67

.001

Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)

.75

.001

North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)

.54

.03

Treaty or Treaty Type

Perhaps less importantly, the model indicated, incidentally, that as total issue
resolutions increased per case, so too did the likelihood that the issues would be
resolved expansively. However, the effect size of 3% for this variable was relatively
small, indicating that this was not important by itself as a predictor of issue
resolutions. It was also found that the frequency of arbitrator appointments
(measured by the total count of appointments per arbitrator) was a significant
factor for jurisdictional issues and cumulatively, but with a relatively small effect
size (3% and 2%, respectively). For the substantive issues, this factor did not have
a significant effect.
These findings supported the expectation that arbitrators would resolve
issues differently for foreign investors that are associated with a major Western
capital-exporter. Overall and for both jurisdictional and substantive issues, all
of the groupings indicated a tendency toward expansive resolutions for these
claimants. The strongest finding was that claimants from those states—when they
bring claims under a BIT or the ECT and raise any of eleven of the coded issues—
are more likely to benefit from an expansive approach. By extension, respondent
states are at a disadvantage relative to claimants overall but are more likely to
benefit from a restrictive approach when the claimant is from a state other than a
major Western capital-exporter, especially if the claim is brought under NAFTA.
What should one make of these results? They may be surprising if one
anticipated that the resolution of contested legal issues would not vary much
according to claimant nationality. Indeed, this expectation is a basic proposition
of impartiality in international adjudication. There are also limitations, however,
in the case of observed tendencies at a systemic level. While arbitrator incentives
provided the rationales for the study’s hypotheses, they should not be taken to
explain the results fully. Other possible explanations that were not tested here
could include variations in ideological preferences of arbitrators, variations in
parties’ legal representation, poor appointment decisions by groups of states or
investors, or variations in the degree to which some cases may influence subsequent
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interpretations.59 The findings are tentative for these and other reasons. Even so,
whatever their explanation, the observed tendencies raise questions about the
fairness of investment treaty arbitration for interests that are not associated with
major Western capital-exporters. They indicate that suspicions of bias about the
system do have a tendency that is linked to the arbitrators’ exercise of discretion.
C. ANTICIPATED TENDENCY IN FAVOUR OF THE UNITED STATES

It was hypothesized that the tendency in favour of an expansive approach would
be lessened where the respondent was France, Germany, the United Kingdom,
or the United States. However, it emerged that the United States was the only
country for which there was data on this issue; that is, among the four countries
initially identified to represent major Western capital-exporting states, only the
United States was subject to a decision in which the arbitrators resolved coded
issues. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom had not been the subject of
such decisions presumably because, unlike the United States, they had (and have)
not consented to investor-state arbitration in a broad-based investment treaty
with another developed state. A few cases against France or Germany under the
ECT came after the cut-off dates for the study. As well, all of the cases against
the United States were brought by Canadian investors under NAFTA. Thus,
while there was sufficient data for reliable findings, the more limited dataset
makes the findings for this hypothesis less robust than the findings for the first
two hypotheses.
For example, due to limited data, it was not possible to test this hypothesis
for jurisdictional or substantive issues alone. It was also not possible to isolate
other potential effects built into the model in order to generate incidental
findings, as was done for the hypothesis related to claimant nationality. That
said, the results indicated that the United States was more likely than other
countries to benefit from a restrictive approach when other variables were held
steady. On a statistically significant basis, the United States benefited from a
restrictive approach:
• 60% more often than the other 45 respondent states under
BITs and the ECT;
59. See e.g. Sisk and Heise, supra note 15 at 746; R Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, “Is the
Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance” (2004)
152:3 U Pa L Rev 1105 at 1129; Catherine A Rogers, “The Arrival of the ‘Have-Nots’
in International Arbitration” (2007) 8:1 Nev LJ 341 at 357-58; Ole Kristian Fauchald,
“The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals—An Empirical Analysis” (2008) 19:2
EJIL 301 at 337-38.
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•
•

55% more often than Canada under NAFTA;
35% more often than Canada and Mexico, under NAFTA and
in one BIT case;
• 35% more often than non-high-income respondent states,60 usually
under BITs and the ECT;
• 37% more often than other OECD states;61 and
• 59% more often than all states other than the Western European
former colonial powers.62
Table 5 outlines the findings in more detail, comparing the United States
alone, as a respondent state, to the other groupings of respondent states not
associated with major Western capital-exporters. Because the data for the United
States arose from its experience as a respondent state under NAFTA, groupings
involving the other NAFTA respondent states—Canada and Mexico—
were also examined.
TABLE 5: ANALYSES OF GROUPINGS OF RESPONDENTS: OVERALL
(ISSUES (1) TO (14))
Grouping
Grouping #1
Group 1A: The United States (n=45)
Group 1B: All other states (n=956)
Grouping #2
Group 2A: The United States (n=45)
Group 2B: Canada (n=32)

Grouping #3
Group 3A: The United States (n=45)
Group 3B: Canada and Mexico (n=89)

60. See supra notes 51-52.
61. See supra notes 49-50.
62. See supra note 46.

Summary of results
This grouping had an overall statistically
significant effect (F=21.65,1,153,p<.01). As a
respondent, the United States was 60% more
likely to benefit from a restrictive resolution
than all other states.
The grouping had an overall statistically
significant effect (F=23.16, 1, 153, p<.01).
The United States was 55% more likely to
benefit from a restrictive resolution than
Canada.
The grouping had an overall statistically
significant effect (F=20.81, 1, 153, p=.04).
The United States was 35% more likely to
benefit from a restrictive resolution than
Canada and Mexico.
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TABLE 5: ANALYSES OF GROUPINGS OF RESPONDENTS: OVERALL
(ISSUES (1) TO (14))
Grouping
Grouping #4
Group 4A: The United States (n=45)
Group 4B: All other states except high income
states as of 1990 and 2000 (n=891)
Grouping #5
Group 5A: The United States (n=45)
Group 5B: All other OECD states as of 1990
(n=41)

Grouping #6
Group 6A: The United States (n=45)
Group 6B: All other OECD states as of 2000
(n=194)
Grouping #7
Group 7A: The United States (n=45)
Group 7B: All other states except Western
European former colonial powers (n=926)

Summary of results
The grouping had an overall statistically
significant effect (F=17.47, 1, 153, p<.01).
The United States was 35% more likely to
benefit from a restrictive resolution than
non-high income states.
The grouping did not have an overall statistically significant effect (F=0.14, 1, 153, p=.89).
The United States was 65% more likely to
benefit from a restrictive resolution than other
OECD states as of 1990, but the effect was
not statistically significant because it carried an
89% risk that it was explained by chance.
The grouping had an overall statistically
significant effect (F=17.03, 1, 153, p=.02).
The United States was 37% more likely to
benefit from a restrictive resolution than other
OECD states as of 2000.
The grouping had an overall statistically
significant effect (F=21.96, 1, 153, p<.01).
The United States was 59% more likely to
benefit from a restrictive resolution than other
states besides the former Western European
colonial powers.

Taken together, these findings support the original hypothesis that the
United States, as a major Western capital exporter, would receive more favourable
treatment in the resolution of contested legal issues. The findings are limited to
the United States and did not test the expectation for other countries on any
statistical basis. Also, the findings emerged only from the United States’ experience
as a respondent exclusively under NAFTA, meaning that they could be explained
by an overall more restrictive approach by NAFTA arbitrators as compared to
BIT and ECT arbitrators. This explanation is contradicted, however, by the
finding that the United States benefited from restrictive resolutions significantly
more than Canada, which was also a respondent state only under NAFTA, and
Mexico, which was a respondent under NAFTA in all but one of the coded cases.
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Further, the coded issues reflected a range (nine) of the fourteen issues that were
coded, and those issues arise often at a general level across the treaties and treaty
types beyond NAFTA.
In the findings for the different groupings of respondent states, compared to
the United States, the higher likelihood of a restrictive resolution in cases against
the United States ranged from 35% to 60%. As an aside, this variation was less
stark than what one sees in the raw coding results, which indicated a much
greater tendency toward restrictive resolutions in favour of the United States. The
difference between the statistical findings and the raw results highlights the role
of the control variables. By holding such variables steady, the apparent benefit
enjoyed by the United States was diminished but still significant. Similarly,
viewed by themselves, the raw results would exaggerate the evidence of a pro-US
bias. With that caveat in mind, I have reproduced the raw results below to shed
greater light on the ways in which the United States was found to benefit more
often from a restrictive approach.
These raw results can be summarized as follows. The fourteen coded issues
were resolved expansively 6 times and restrictively 39 times in cases against the
United States. In NAFTA cases against Canada and Mexico, the respective ratios
were 24 to 8 and 34 to 14. In cases against all other respondent states under all
treaties and treaty types, the proportion was 730 expansive to 216 restrictive.
Thus, the proportion of expansive resolutions was 13% for the United States
(2016) 52toOSGOODE
HALL
LAW JOURNAL
in32contrast
75% for
Canada,
71% for Mexico, and 77% for all other states.
Figures 3 and 4 represent these descriptive findings about the raw results.
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TABLE 6: RAW CODING RESULTS FOR ALL ISSUE RESOLUTIONS UNDER NAFTA
Canada
Issue 1: Corporate person investor

Mexico

The United
States

6 expansive63

3 restrictive64

Issue 2: Natural person investor
Issue 3: Concept of investment

3 restrictive65
6 expansive66

3 restrictive67

Issue 4: Minority shareholder interests

6 expansive69

Issue 6: Parallel claims

3 expansive70

6 restrictive68
3 restrictive71

63. Waste Management, Inc v United Mexican States (2004), 43 ILM 967 at paras 76-77, 85
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [Waste Management]; Fireman’s
Fund Insurance Company v The United Mexican States (2003), 15:6 WTAM 3 at para 5
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes); Fireman’s Fund Insurance
Company v The United Mexican States (2006), ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/02/01 at paras
137-38 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes).
64. The Loewen Group, Inc and Raymond L Loewen v United States of America (2003), 42 ILM
811 at paras 220-39 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [Loewen]
65. Ibid.
66. Pope & Talbot Inc v The Government of Canada (2000), UNCITRAL Rules at para 96 [Pope
& Talbot #1]; SD Myers, Inc v The Government of Canada (2000), 40 ILM 1408 [SD Myers].
For the majority opinion, see ibid at paras 226-31. For Schwartz’s separate opinion, see
ibid at paras 39-41.
67. Bayview Irrigation District et al v United Mexican States (2007), 19:5 WTAM 5 at
paras 91, 98-105.
68. Methanex Corporation v United States of America (2005), 44 ILM 1345, at paras
IV.D.16-IV.D.18 [Methanex]; Canadian Cattleman for Fair Trade v United States of America
(2008), UNCITRAL Rules at paras 111-12, 193.
69. GAMI Investments, Inc v The Government of the United Mexican States (2004), 44 ILM 545 at
paras 26-35 [GAMI]; International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v The United Mexican
States (2006), 18:2 WTAM 59 at paras 97-110 [International Thunderbird].
70. GAMI, ibid at paras 24-42.
71. Loewen, supra note 64 at paras 143, 149, 154.
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TABLE 6: RAW CODING RESULTS FOR ALL ISSUE RESOLUTIONS UNDER NAFTA
The United
States

Canada

Mexico

Issue 8: National treatment

6 expansive72
5 restrictive73

1 expansive74
6 restrictive75

Issue 9: Fair and equitable treatment
(autonomous standard)

3 expansive77

Issue 10: Fair and equitable treatment
(content)

6 expansive79

6 expansive80
5 restrictive81

6 expansive82
6 restrictive83

Issue 12: Indirect/regulatory
expropriation

3 expansive84
3 restrictive85

12 expansive86

6 restrictive87

9 restrictive76
3 restrictive78

72. Pope & Talbot Inc v The Government of Canada (2001), 13:4 WTAM 61 at paras 76-78 [Pope
& Talbot #2]; SD Myers, supra note 66 at paras 250-55; United Parcel Service of America, Inc v
Government of Canada (2007), UNCITRAL Rules at paras 17, 94-96, 101-02 (International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [United Parcel Service].
73. Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v The Government of Canada (2010), UNCITRAL Rules at paras
83, 87-93 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes); United Parcel
Service, supra note 72 at paras 98-101, 117, 135-36, 174-78.
74. International Thunderbird, supra note 69 at paras 2-4, Walde.
75. GAMI, supra note 69 at paras 112, 114-15; Marvin Feldman v Mexico (2002), 42 ILM
625 at 6-9, 15 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes), Blanco
[Feldman]; International Thunderbird, supra note 74 at paras 180-83.
76. DF Group Inc v United States of America (2003), 15:3 WTAM 55 at paras 157-58
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [ADF]; Loewen, supra note 64
at paras 139-40; Methanex, supra note 68 at paras IV.B.12-IV.B.29.
77. Pope & Talbot #2, supra note 72 at paras 108-18.
78. ADF, supra note 76 at para 183.
79. Pope & Talbot #2, supra note 72 at paras 116, 118; SD Myers, supra note 66. For the majority
opinion, see ibid at paras 263, 266-68. For Schwartz’s separate opinion, see ibid at para 233.
80. GAMI, supra note 69 at paras 103-04, 107-10; Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican
States (2000), 40 ILM 36 at paras 89, 97-101 (International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes) [Metalclad].
81. Waste Management, supra note 63 at paras 92-93, 98-101; International Thunderbird, supra
note 69 at paras 194-201.
82. ADF, supra note 76 at para 188; Mondev International Ltd v United States of America (2002),
42 ILM 85 at paras 113-27 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes).
83. Loewen, supra note 64 at paras 132-37; Methanex, supra note 68 at paras IV.C.14-IV.C.25.
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Based on the statistical findings for this hypothesis, it is evident that aspects
of investment treaty law that may give rise to substantial state liability have been
applied less rigorously to the United States than to the other NAFTA states under
NAFTA and, although the comparison is less direct because it involves treaties
other than NAFTA, to other respondent states. There was no basis to evaluate
whether this pro-US tendency extended to other major Western capital-exporters.
However, the pro-US variation in the case of NAFTA claims by Canadian
investors against the United States, and in favour of US investors that brought
NAFTA or BIT against other states, suggests tentatively that there is a degree of
hierarchy among Western capital-exporters themselves.
Reflecting on the original theoretical rationales for the hypotheses for the
study, the findings provide support for the hypothesis of systemic pro-US bias
based on the disproportionate power of the United States over the economic
position of arbitrators and the arbitration industry. They also provide support
for the expectation that US power in the organizations that exercise default
appointing authority, and in the negotiation of investment treaties, would affect
how arbitrators exercise their discretionary power. They also appear relevant to
the widely known contextual fact, regarding case outcomes, that the United
States has never lost a NAFTA case. That is, if the arbitrators tend to apply the
same disciplines more softly to the United States than to other states, it is less
surprising that the United States rarely (or never) loses cases. However, I stress
that, like other findings in this study, the results may be explained by a range of
alternative explanations such as a superior legal capacity of the US government
or ideological preferences of the arbitrators.

VII. CONCLUSION
The present study was an attempt to use empirical methods to test specific
hypotheses of systemic bias arising from larger institutional concerns. It relied
84. Pope & Talbot #1, supra note 66 at paras 96, 101-02.
85. D Myers, supra note 66. For the majority opinion, see ibid at paras 281, 287. For
Schwartz’s separate opinion, see ibid at paras 220-23.
86. Feldman, supra note 75 at paras 100-11, 128-29; Waste Management, supra note 63 at
paras 143, 155, 160-62, 171-77; Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle
Ingredients Americas, Inc v The United Mexican States (2007), 146 ILR 439 at paras 240-48
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes); Metalclad, supra note 80 at
paras 107, 111-12.
87. Methanex, supra note 68 at para IV.D.7; Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America (2009), 48
ILM 1035 at paras 354-57, 536 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes).
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on a content analysis of arbitrators’ resolutions of contested legal issues instead
of other empirical approaches and so offers only one perspective, derived from a
particular method. In turn, its findings should be taken as tentative.
It was somewhat eye opening, however, to find strong support for the
anticipated tendency toward an expansive (pro-claimant) approach and, more so,
for the expected accentuation of this tendency in the case of claimants from the
four major Western capital-exporting states. The finding of significant support
for the expected reduced tendency in cases against the United States was also
eye-opening, though it was less robust because it was based on a smaller amount
of data and thus more limited to the sample of data that was coded and analyzed.
To put this point in other words, the findings of (1) apparent systemic
bias in favour of the United States as a respondent state were limited to the
cumulative results under NAFTA, and primarily to the US-Canadian investor
relationship, and thus were less robust than those of (2) apparent systemic bias
in favour of claimants from the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
and Germany, as a group, across jurisdictional and substantive issues both in
isolation and cumulatively. Both sets of findings were supported incidentally by
analyses of other groupings of comparable states, such as G-7 states, Western
European former colonial powers, OECD members (to represent Western
capital-exporting states), and the opposites of these three categories (to represent
other states in the world).
The study is subject to important limitations that I have summarized in
the introduction and text of this article, and elaborated previously.88 Briefly,
empirical research cannot resolve issues of possible bias in any particular case. At
the systemic level, an empirical project should be understood as an attempt to
falsify discrete expectations (i.e., that arbitrators in general would be influenced by
their unique and apparent dependencies on prospective claimants and powerful
states), not to prove or disprove possible bias.89 This study is not, nor will there
ever be, a final word on whether there is bias in the system.90
Keeping these limitations in mind, the findings provide a perspective on
how arbitrators are able to, and may in fact, shift the rules according to who is
suing whom and may even be incented to do so as a result of their unique status
compared to other adjudicators who decide similar types of disputes. My view
based on this study is that there is only tentative evidence of the expectations
88. See Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour,” supra note 5 at 231-33.
89. See Richard Lempert, “Empirical Research for Public Policy: With Examples from Family
Law” (2008) 5:4 J Empirical Leg Stud 907.
90. See Sisk and Heise, supra note 15 at 794.
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of systemic bias at present, but that this evidence supports the well-established
doctrinal and theoretical rationales for using institutional safeguards of judicial
independence, such as secure tenure, a set amount of remuneration not dependent
on the length or frequency of cases, objective methods of case assignment, and
prohibitions on issue conflicts and outside counsel work, to reduce the risk of
actual and perceived bias in adjudication. Such safeguards would help to ensure
that states, investors, and other affected actors do not have a reasonable basis for
concern about potential bias.
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APPENDIX I: CODING OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue 8 (National treatment): Expansive approach91
Flexible approach to national treatment, indicated by:
(a) the non-application of the requirement for “like circumstances” or “similarly situated”
investors/investments; or
(b) a broad approach to “like circumstances,” including where it is based on an approach that is
at least as broad as a competition-based reading (i.e., one that focuses simply on the competitive
relationship between the compared investors/investments and that does not account for
differences based on policy considerations such as health or environmental risks arising from the
economic activity); or
(c) a low evidentiary threshold (e.g., less than a balance of probabilities or its approximate
equivalent, with no requirement for systemic discrimination beyond individual comparator(s))
for a claimant to establish de facto discrimination; and
(d) a low evidentiary threshold to establish protectionist intent as the sole basis for a breach (e.g.,
ambiguous statements by a public officer are potentially justified by other policy objectives that
provide a non-economic rationale in favour of domestic competitors).
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
Where elements of a tribunal’s interpretation fall under both the expansive and restrictive
categories, they were classifyied as “issue arose, non-classifiable/neutral.”

91. For the cases on which this was modeled, see Occidental Exploration and Production Company
v The Republic of Ecuador (2004), 17:1 WTAM 165 (London Court of International
Arbitration) [Occidental] (finding a violation of national treatment, although the compared
investments were not in like circumstances); Pope & Talbot #2, supra note 72 (adopting a
competition-based approach to like circumstances, presuming a violation based on initial
evidence of de facto discrimination subject to broad exceptions, and rejecting a proposed
requirement for proof of disproportionate disadvantage); Saluka Investments BV (The
Netherlands) v The Czech Republic (2006), 18:3 WTAM 166 [Saluka] (requiring the state to
justify any differential treatment).
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APPENDIX I: CODING OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue 8 (National treatment): Restrictive approach92
Restrictive approach to national treatment, indicated by:
(a) a strict approach to “like circumstances” or “similarly situated”; or
(b) declining to find like circumstances based solely on a competition-based reading; or
(c) a rigorous evidentiary threshold (e.g., a balance of probabilities or its approximate equivalent,
or higher, with a requirement for evidence of systemic discrimination beyond individual
comparator(s)) for a claimant to establish de facto discrimination; or
(d) a requirement of protectionist intent as a condition of breach.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
Where elements of a tribunal’s interpretation fall under both the expansive and restrictive
categories, they were classified as “issue arose, non-classifiable/ neutral.”
Issue 9 (Fair and equitable treatment—relationship to customary standard):
Expansive approach93
Broad approach to fair and equitable treatment, indicated by:
(a) establishment as an autonomous standard beyond customary standard.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning. In
the NAFTA context, where the issue is dealt with by a statement of interpretation of the treaty
on behalf of the states parties, then this qualifies as non-classifiable (i.e., resolved by treaty).

92. For the cases on which this was modeled, see United Parcel Service, supra note 72 (adopting
a relatively flexible approach to like circumstances); ADF, supra note 76 (adopting a rigorous
approach to the investor’s evidentiary burden to establish de facto discrimination).
93. For the cases on which this was modeled, see CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Republic
of Argentina (2003), 42 ILM 788 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes) [CMS Gas] (equating a broad version of fair and equitable treatment to the
customary minimum standard); Occidental, supra note 91 (declining to limit fair and
equitable treatment to the customary standard); Siemens AG v The Argentine Republic
(2004), 44 ILM 138 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [Siemens]
(declining to limit fair and equitable treatment to the customary standard).
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APPENDIX I: CODING OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue 9 (Fair and equitable treatment—relationship to customary standard):
Restrictive approach94
Narrow approach to fair and equitable treatment, indicated by:
(b) limitation to customary standard.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning. In
the NAFTA context, where the issue is dealt with by a statement of interpretation of the treaty
on behalf of the states parties, then this qualifies as non-classifiable (i.e., resolved by treaty).

94. For the case on which this was modeled, see Noble Ventures, Inc v Romania (2005), ICSID
Case No ARB/01/11 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [Noble
Ventures] (limiting fair and equitable treatment to the customary standard).
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APPENDIX I: CODING OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue 10 (Fair and equitable treatment—content): Expansive approach95
Restrictive approach to fair and equitable treatment, indicated by:
(a) where limited to a customary standard, the application of a requirement to establish state practice
and opinio juris as the basis for novel aspects of customary standard; or
(b) whether or not limited to a customary standard, the limitation of the standard to the Neer or
ELSI terminology and/or rejection or serious containment of novel concepts (e.g., by incorporation of
a rigorous duty on the claimant to know and evaluate the law of the host state and prospect of legal
reform, or by the adoption of a deferential position where the host state has an objective basis for the
decision).
NOTES: The “Neer or ELSI terminology” is that of “outrage,” “bad faith,” “willful disregard of
due process of law,” “willful neglect of duty,” “an extreme insufficiency of action,” “insufficiency of
governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man
would readily recognize its insufficiency,” or conduct that would “shock or at least surprise a sense of
judicial propriety.”96
“Novel concepts” are indicated by such terminology as “idiosyncratic,” “unreasonable,” “legitimate
expectations” (including incorporation of a strict duty of the state to abide by specific undertakings
as an umbrella-like component of fair and equitable treatment), stability of the legal and business
framework, affirmative transparency obligations of the host state (without emphasis on the investor’s
duty to know and evaluate the law and to anticipate possible legal reforms), or breach of another
international obligation, where the terminology is not limited by a strong statement of the need for
deference wherever the host state has an objective basis for its decision.
An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in the text of the
relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.

95. For the cases on which this was modeled, see CMS Gas, supra note 93 (concluding that
arbitrary or discriminatory treatment in general would violate fair and equitable treatment
and went beyond the language in Neer, supra note 36, or ELSI, supra note 36; requiring
stability and predictability; and precluding any need for bad faith in favour of an objective
assessment of whether legitimate expectations of the foreign investor were met); Occidental,
supra note 91 (approaching fair and equitable treatment as an objective requirement not
requiring bad faith and incorporating the concept of legal and business stability); Sempra
Energy International v Argentine Republic (2005), ICSID Case No ARB/02/16 (International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) [Sempra Energy] (incorporating concepts
of legal stability and observance of legal obligations); Siemens, supra note 93 (broadening
the language in Neer, supra note 36, and ELSI, supra note 36; incorporating the concept of
legitimate expectations; and precluding any requirement for bad faith).
96. For the cases on which this was modeled, see Genin (Alex) and Others v Republic of Estonia
(2001), 17:2 ICSID Rev 395 (limiting the standard to the language in Neer, supra note
36, and ELSI, supra note 36); Noble Ventures, supra note 94 (applying the standard in
ELSI, supra note 36).
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APPENDIX I: CODING OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue 10 (Fair and equitable treatment—content): Restrictive approach97
Restrictive approach to fair and equitable treatment, indicated by:
(a) where limited to a customary standard, the application of a requirement to establish state practice
and opinio juris as the basis for novel aspects of customary standard; or
(b) whether or not limited to a customary standard, the limitation of the standard to the Neer or
ELSI terminology and/or rejection or serious containment of novel concepts (e.g., by incorporation of
a rigorous duty on the claimant to know and evaluate the law of the host state and prospect of legal
reform, or by the adoption of a deferential position where the host state has an objective basis for the
decision).
NOTES: The “Neer or ELSI terminology” is that of “outrage,” “bad faith,” “willful disregard of
due process of law,” “willful neglect of duty,” “an extreme insufficiency of action,” “insufficiency of
governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man
would readily recognize its insufficiency,” or conduct that would “shock or at least surprise a sense of
judicial propriety.”98
“Novel concepts” are indicated by such terminology as “idiosyncratic,” “unreasonable,” “legitimate
expectations” (including incorporation of a strict duty of the state to abide by specific undertakings
as an umbrella-like component of fair and equitable treatment), stability of the legal and business
framework, affirmative transparency obligations of the host state (without emphasis on the investor’s
duty to know and evaluate the law and to anticipate possible legal reforms), or breach of another
international obligation, where the terminology is not limited by a strong statement of the need for
deference wherever the host state has an objective basis for its decision.
An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in the text of the
relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.

97. Neer, supra note 36; ELSI, supra note 36.
98. Ibid.
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APPENDIX I: CODING OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue 11 (Full protection and security): Expansive approach99
Expansive approach to full protection and security, indicated by:
(a) the expansion beyond issues of physical security of the investor and investment to include
concepts of legal security and stability of the investment climate; or
(b) the assignment of full responsibility to the host state for physical harm suffered by the
investor or investment without discussion of severe longstanding conflict in a country that
provides context for the physical harm suffered.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
Issue 11 (Full protection and security): Restrictive approach100
Narrow approach to full protection and security, indicated by:
(a) the limitation to issues of physical security; or
(b) the alleviation of the host state’s responsibility for physical harm suffered by the investor
or investment based on severe longstanding conflict in a country that provides context for the
physical harm suffered.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.

99. For the cases on which this was modeled, see CME Republic BV (The Netherlands) v The
Czech Republic (2001), 14:3 WTAM 109 (extending the standard to security and protection
of the investment); Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, AS v The Slovak Republic (1999), 17:3
WTAM 189 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (finding a breach
based on the state’s conduct in the interpretation of contractual terms); Azurix Corp v The
Argentine Republic (2006), ICSID Case No ARB/01/12 (International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes) (extending the standard beyond protection against physical violence
to create a state obligation to ensure a secure investment environment).
100. For the cases on which this was modeled, see PSEG Global Inc, The North American Coal
Corporation, and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v Republic of Turkey
(2004), 44 ILM 465 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (limiting
the standard to physical safety); Saluka, supra note 91 (limiting the standard to civil strife
and physical violence); Rumeli Telekom AS and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri AS
v Republic of Kazakhstan (2008), ICSID Case No ARB/05/16 (International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes) (limiting the standard to physical integrity without
extending it to legal or economic security).
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APPENDIX I: CODING OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue 12 (Indirect/regulatory expropriation): Expansive approach101
Expansive approach to indirect expropriation, indicated by:
(a) a test for indirect expropriation that focuses exclusively or primarily on the effect of the
measure on the investor and that ignores or seriously downplays other potentially relevant
factors, such as the regulatory purpose of measure (even where the measure is non-discriminatory) or a requirement for enrichment of the host state; or
(b) the extension of an effects-based analysis of indirect expropriation to situations in which the
effect on the investor/investment is “significant” or “substantial,” or otherwise less than a “nearly
complete taking” of the investment; or
(c) the allowance of an expropriation claim based on severance of the property right or
economic interest into segments, which are then subjected to a distinctive analysis for
expropriation.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
Issue 12 (Indirect/regulatory expropriation): Restrictive approach102
Restrictive approach to indirect expropriation, indicated by:
(a) a test for indirect expropriation that excludes all measures that are adopted for a legitimate
public purpose or that applies stringent limiting factors beyond the effect on the investor/
investment, such as a requirement for enrichment by the host state; or
(b) the limitation of an effects-based analysis of indirect expropriation to situations in which the
effect on the investor/investment is a “nearly complete taking” (or equivalent); or
(c) the refusal to allow an expropriation claim on the basis that it represented an attempt to
sever the property right or economic interest into segments, which would then be subjected to a
distinctive analysis for expropriation.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
101. For the cases on which this was modeled, see Metalclad, supra note 80 (adopting
an effects-based analysis and extending the concept of indirect expropriation to
non-discriminatory measures passed for a public purpose regardless of specific commitments
of the state); Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA v The United Mexican States (2003),
43 ILM 133 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (disregarding
the government’s intentions and shifting the burden to the state to justify measure as
proportionate); Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v Ghana Investments Centre and the
Government of Ghana (1989), 95 ILR 184 (declining to consider the regulatory aims of the
state as a factor).
102. For the cases on which this was modeled, see Methanex, supra note 68 (declining to find an
indirect expropriation where the measure was for a public purpose, non-discriminatory, and
not in breach of a specific commitment of the state); Olguín (Eudoro Armando) v Republic of
Paraguay (2001), 18:1 ICSID Rev 143 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes) (declining to find an indirect expropriation arising from a mere omission of the
state and without enrichment of the state); Lauder (Ronald S) v Czech Republic (2001), 4
WTAM 35 (requiring enrichment of the respondent state to find a violation).
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APPENDIX I: CODING OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Issue 13 (Scope of umbrella clause): Expansive approach103
Expansive approach to umbrella clauses, indicated by:
(a) an interpretation that the umbrella clause can be violated by private or commercial acts of
the host state (i.e., any breach of contract).
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
Issue 13 (Scope of umbrella clause): Restrictive approach104
Restrictive approach to umbrella clauses, indicated by:
(a) a limitation of the umbrella clause to cases of sovereign interference or denial of justice or
equivalent “public” acts of the host state, without extending to private or commercial acts of the state.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
Issue 14 (Essential/national security): Expansive approach105
Narrow approach to essential or national security exception, indicated by:
(a) the exclusion, from the scope of the exception, of emergency measures to address a domestic
financial and economic crisis.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
Issue 14 (Essential/national security): Restrictive approach106
Flexible approach to essential or national security exception, indicated by:
(a) the inclusion, within the scope of the exception, of emergency measures to address a
domestic financial and economic crisis.
NOTES: An award is non-classifiable where the issue is dealt with expressly and specifically in
the text of the relevant investment treaty and this forms the basis of the tribunal’s reasoning.
103. For the cases on which this was modeled, see Duke Energy Electroquil Partners &
Electroquil SA v Republic of Ecuador (2008), 20:6 WTAM 189 (International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes) (extending the umbrella clause beyond situations of
sovereign interference).
104. For the cases on which this was modeled, see SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Islamic
Republic of Pakistan (2003), 42 ILM 1290 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes) (declining to extend the umbrella clause to domestic contractual obligations);
Impregilo SpA v Islamic Republic of Pakistan (2005), ICSID Case No ARB/03/3 (International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) (concluding that the respondent state could
only breach the treaty through acts of sovereign authority).
105. For the cases on which this was modeled, see CMS Gas, supra note 93; Sempra Energy, supra
note 95 (both of which rejecting Argentina’s essential security defence).
106 For the cases on which this was modeled, see Continental Casualty Company v The Argentine
Republic (2006), ICSID Case No ARB/03/9 (International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes); LG&E Energy Corp, G&E Capital Corp, and LG&E International, Inc
v Argentine Republic (2006), 46 ILM 40 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes) (both of which partially allowing Argentina’s essential security defence).
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TABLE 7: REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE MODEL
Estimate

Std.Error

t-value

p-value

Intercept

Coefficients

1.20

0.48

2.48

0.01

Claimant nationality:2

0.65

0.69

0.95

0.34

Claimant nationality:3

-0.13

0.70

-0.18

0.86

Claimant nationality:4

1.07

0.54

1.99

0.05

Claimant nationality:5

0.74

0.35

2.10

0.04

Specific issue:2

-26.68

51154.92

0.00

1.00

Specific issue:3

-0.85

0.44

-1.92

0.06

Specific issue:4

-0.32

0.56

-0.57

0.57

Specific issue:5

-1.97

0.59

-3.37

0.00

Specific issue:6

-0.11

0.44

-0.25

0.80

Specific issue:7

-3.07

0.49

-6.23

<.00001

Specific issue:8

-3.52

0.48

-7.31

<.00001

Specific issue:9

-2.60

0.49

-5.30

<.00001

Specific issue:10

-1.00

0.44

-2.27

0.02

Specific issue:11

-4.19

0.50

-8.42

<.00001

Specific issue:12

-2.51

0.43

-5.83

<.00001

Specific issue:13

-0.62

0.64

-0.97

0.33

Specific issue:14

-2.84

0.58

-4.85

<.00001

Treat category:2

0.64

0.64

1.00

0.32

Treat category:3

-0.85

0.43

-1.97

0.05

Treat category:4

-0.76

1.42

-0.54

0.59

Total Issue resolutions

0.29

0.08

3.67

0.00

Total arbitrator appointments

0.08

0.05

1.79

0.07
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TABLE 8: EFFECT SIZES FOR INDIVIDUAL PREDICTORS IN THE MODEL
Dataset
jurisdictional
issues

Dataset
substantive
issues

Dataset
cumulative

Claimant’s state of nationality

0.08

0.08

0.09

Specific issue among coded issues

0.08

0.06

0.06

Category of treaty or treaty type

0.07

0.06

0.06

Total issue resolutions in the case

0.02

0.03

0.03

Total appointments per arbitrator

0.03

0.00

0.02

Individual Predictor

